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NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF MANliFACTURER OR VENDOR TO AN
Ar.LERGic1 CONSUMER-The study of allergies is relatively new to the
medical profession. It is not surprising, therefore, that only a few courts
have dealt with the problem of the liability of the manufacturer or vendor to the consumer who is allergic to an ingredient in the defendant's
product. Many dyes, cosmetics, drugs and health and beauty aids in
universal use, however, contain known allergenic ingredients. 2 Medical
authorities estimate the incidence of well-defined allergies at between
five to ten per cent of the total population3 and one authority suggests
that allergies are actually increasing in frequency. 4 When we add to
this parade of horrors the fact that medical knowledge of allergies has
increased tremendously in recent years, we may well expect many
appellate courts to be called upon to define the scope of the manufacturer's or vendor's liability in this field. The purpose of this comment
is to examine briefly the reported cases and to evaluate the various approaches to the problem. 5

1 "Allergy, in its broad implication, designates hypersensitiveness in man and evidences
itself by abnormal responses of tissues to physical or chemical stimuli." FEINBERG, ALLERGY
IN PRACTICE, 2d ed., 3 (1946). Although this definition is too broad for medical accuracy,
it is sufficient for our purposes. It is the "abnormal" feature of the reaction, whether caused
by a primary irritant or by an allergen, that presents the legal problem. For. a medically
accurate definition of "allergy,'' see Comrn, ALLERGY IN THEORY .AND PRACTICE 263-4
(1947); FEINBERG, .ALLERGY IN PRACTICE, 2d ed., 687 (1946).
2 CooKE, ALLERGY IN THEORY .AND PRACTICE 272-288 (1947). Most cosmetic dermatitus is due to allergy. Id. at 282.
3 Co01rn, .ALLERGY IN THEORY .AND PRACTICE 3 (1947); FEINBERG, ALLERGY IN PRACTICE, 2d ed., 83 (1946).
4 VAUGHAN, PRACTICE OF ALLERGY, rev. by Black, 3-6 (1948).
5 The scope of this comment is limited to a discussion of liability for negligence. Several cases involve a warranty action against the plaintiff's immediate vendor. Since the
question of liability usually depends upon the court's interpretation of section 15(1) of
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Let us assume a "typical" situation. D manufactures lipstick which
is sold by retailers in its original, metal tubes. The product is entirely
safe to the vast majority of consumers, but a small fraction are allergic
to one of its ingredients. The label on the tube does not list the ingredients, nor does it display a warning that some persons can not safely
use the product. P purchases D's product, uses it, and as a result suffers
a severe dermatitis of the lips. In a negligence action by P against D,
what is the real issue? Undoubtedly, most first year law students would
reply that the question is one of duty. Does D have a duty to warn the
public that its product contains an ingredient that is harmful to a few
people? To answer this question, our student would ask for additional
facts-did D know that a certain class of consumers were allergic to his
product? 6 If not, should D, in the exercise of reasonable care, have
known? 7 Only if the student were able to pass the "duty" obstacle
would he deal with the question of whether D's breach of duty was the
cause of P's injury.

A. The Proximate Cause Approach
But several appellate courts would not agree with our student's
characterization of the problem. Instead, they have apparently assumed
defendant's negligence but have been troubled by the question of causation. 8 If there is no evidence that the defendant's assumed negligence
was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury, this causal approach may
be justifiable simply because it avoids the difficult and unnecessary dethe Uniform Sales Act, no persuasive analogy can be drawn between the warranty and
the negligence cases. However, for those readers who may be interested in comparing the
different approaches to the problem of the allergic consumer, the following warranty cases
are instructive. Vendor held liable: Flynn v. Bedell Co. of Mass., 242 Mass. 450, 136 N.E.
252 (1922); Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N.E. 631 (1934);
Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E. (2d) 697 (1939); noted in
19 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 501 (1939); Zerpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.
(2d) 73 (1939); Reynolds v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A. (2d) 666 (1947).
Liability denied: Zager v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 324, 86 P. (2d) 389
(1939); Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A. (2d) 650 (1939).
6 Essentially, then, the problem is similar to the one presented in the famous case of
Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., (8th Cir. 1903) 120 F. 865, holding that
a manufacturer of a threshing machine must warn the public of hidden dangers known to
the manufacturer.
7 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);. Donoghue
v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. (H.L.) 562.
s Wilson v. Goldman, 133 Minn. 281, 158 N.W. 332 (1916); Hamilton v. Harris,
(Tex. Civ. App., 1918) 204 S.W. 450; Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N.Y. 360, 160 N.E. 398
(1928); Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, (Tex. Civ. App., 1933) 59 S.W. (2d) 895;
Zager v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 324, 86 P. (2d) 389 (1939) (breach
of warranty action).
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termination of negligence. 9 But at least two courts have held·tliat tlie
plaintiff's allergy, as a matter of law, breaks tlie causal chain. In Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller,1° tlie plaintiff purchased eyeglasses from
tlie defendant and suffered injury ·from contact witli tlie dye on tlie
frames. Expert witnesses for tlie plaintiff and tlie defendant agreed tliat
tlie plaintiff was allergic to tlie dye and tliat such allergy was very rare.
In reversing a judgment for tlie plaintiff, tlie court first posed several
questions relevant to tlie determination of negligence. It answered
tliese questions by saying tliat negligence, to be actionable, must be tlie
proximate cause of tlie injury and tlie test of causation is: "... whetlier
in tlie light of all attendant circumstances, tlie injury was such as ought
reasonably to have been anticipated as a consequence of tlie act."11 The
same court, in an earlier case, said: 'We tliink tlie jury should have
been told in appropriate language tliat, if tliey believe tlie proximate
cause of tlie injuries to appellee was his abnormal hypersensitiveness,
but for which the injury would not have occurred, a verdict should be
returned for defendant."12
The confusion between negligence and causation did not begin
witli allergy cases.13 It is difficult, however, to find a more obvious misapplication of proximate cause principles tlian in tliese allergy cases.
If tlie defendant was in fact negligent, tlie type of injury (usually dermatitis) is tlie very one tliat should have been anticipated.14 Nor can
it be said tliat tlie plaintiff's allergy is an intervening causal factor. 15
There is simply no room for tlie application of such proximate cause
9 This is, apparently, the rationale of Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N.Y. 360, 160 N.E.
398 (1928), which held that the lapse of twelve hours between the contact with the defendant's product and the plaintiff's injury raised no inference of causation since the product
was not shown to be inherently dangerous and poisonous. But in Cahill v. Inecto, Inc., 208
App. Div. 191, 203 N.Y.S. 1 (1924), involving the same product, the lapse of seven hours
between contact and injury supported an inference of causation. Other New York cases
simply add to the confusion: Bundy v. Ey-Teb, Inc., 160 Misc. 325, 289 N.Y.S. 905
(1935); Cleary v. John M. Maris Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 38 (1940); Pratt
v. E. W. Edwards & Son, 227 App. Div. 210, 237 N.Y.S. 372 (1929); Petzold v. Roux
Laboratories, Inc., 256 App. Div. 1096, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 565 (1939); Maher v. Clairol, Inc.,
263 App. Div. 848, 31 N.Y.S. (2d) 751 (1941).
In Wilson v. Goldman, 133 Minn. 281, 158 N.W. 332 (1916), the court, in finding
causation, relied on the probability that the plaintiff was allergic to the defendant's product!
10 (Tex. Civ. App., 1933) 59 S.W. (2d) 895.
11 Id. at 897.
12 Hamilton v. Harris, (Tex. Civ. App., 1918) 204 S.W. 450 at 451. See, also, Zager
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 324 at 333, 86 P. (2d) 389 (1939).
13 For a well-annotated discussion, see PROSSER, ToRTS 311-320 (1941).
14 Even if the injury could be said to be extraordinary, the causal chain would not be
broken. In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
1 5 22 R.C.L., Proximate Cause, §135 (1912); 48 L.R.A. (n.s.) 119 (1914); PROSSER,
TORTS 340-352 (1941).
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limitations in the allergy cases. It would be just as fair to say: "But for
the plaintiff's presence under the wheels of the negligently operated
automobile the injury would not have occurred."

B. The Negligence Approach
It is unfortunate that the difficult yet interesting question of negligence has so often been avoided. Of the few cases which have defined
the extent of the manufacturer's or vendor's duty to the allergic plaintiff, two have produced well-considered opinions.16 In the Gerkin
case,1 7 the purchaser of a coat brought suit against the wholesaler for
injuries attributed to contact with the dyed fur collar. The plaintiff
had worn the coat for about three months, unaware that his discomfort
was due to contact with the dyed fur. The president of the defendant
corporation admitted that about one out of one hundred purchasers of
dyed fur complain of bad effects; that in the preceding ten years he
had received about twenty complaints; and that, on investigation, all
he had discovered was that some people could not wear dyed fur. The
court held that the defendant's failure to warn the plaintiff of the existence of the hidden danger was negligence. "That the great majority
of persons are safe from the particular danger concealed in the article
sold, or that few injuries in fact result from its use, does not militate
against this principle [duty to warn] when the certain fact of imminent
danger to a percentage is established."18 It is important to note that
the defendant here had actual knowledge that some people could not
safely wear dyed fur. 19
In Arnold v. May Department Stores Co.,2° the defendant's beauty
operator recommended to the plaintiff a hair dye called Notox. The
plaintiff informed the operator that she had suffered a skin eruption
ten years ago from a hair dye and, consequently, was afraid of anything
but henna. The operator reassured her and applied no test beforehand,
despite the fact that the manufacturer's instructions in the box of Notox
contained a warning that persons with a pronounced idiosyncrasy to
skin or scalp diseases should not use any hair coloring.21 As a result
16 Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913); Arnold v. May
Dept. Stores Co., 337 Mo. 727, 85 S.W. (2d) 748 (1935).
11177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913).
1s Id. at 61. Italics added.
19 In accord: Taylor v. Newcomb Baking Co., 317 Mass. 609, 59 N.E. (2d) 293
(1945). Cf. Gould v. Slater Woolen Co., 147 Mass. 315, 17 N.E. 531 (1888).
20 337 Mo. 727, 85 S.W. (2d) 748 (1935).
21 This same product was involved in Cahill v. Inecto, Inc., 208 App. Div. 191, 203
N.Y.S. 1 (1924) and Karr v. Inecto, Inc., 247 N.Y. 360, 160 N.E. 398 (1928). See note
8 supra. One wonders if the warning was a result of that litigation.

1950]

COMMENTS

257

of the application of the dye, the plaintiff suffered severe injuries. Disinterested hairdressers testified that in thousands of applications of
Notox they had received no complaint. Although the plaintiff was admittedly allergic to one of the ingredients of the dye, the Missouri court,
in a well-reasoned opinion, affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff.
Although the court relied heavily on the Gerkin case, it went on to say:
"... plaintiff recovered ... on the theory that plaintiff was sensitized,
or possessed an idiosyncrasy to the dye, which caused her to suffer the
injuries complained of, and that defendant knew, or should have
known, that plaintiff was so sensitized."22
In the Gerkin case, the defendant had actual knowledge of danger
to some consumers of his product; in the Arnold case, the defendant
knew only that this plaintiff had suffered injuries from the use of a hair
dye ten years before. Nor was there any evidence that the defendant
was aware of the manufacturer's warning.23 The meager knowledge
which the defendant did possess, however, was sufficient to put the
defendant on notice that the plaintiff was allergic to this product. Knowing that the plaintiff was allergic, the application of the dye without
taking some sort of precaution was negligence. 24 To the extent that
the defendant was not required to have actual knowledge of the allergenic effect of the hair dye, the Arnold case extends liability beyond
the holding of the Gerkin case.
The fact situation in a recent California case25 was similar to the
hypothetical "lipstick case" posed at the beginning of this comment.
The plaintiff obtained a "Helene Curtis" cold wave in a beauty shop.
The solution was 6.28% thioglycollate acid. Three days after the
beauty treatment, the plaintiff suffered a severe dermatitis which required medical treatment for about six months. She brought suit
against the manufacturer, alleging that the defendant negligently failed
to warn the public that the solution contained thioglycollate acid and
that many persons were susceptible to damage through its use. A skin
specialist testified that thioglycollate acid is a direct irritant if used in a
concentration of over 7 or 8 per cent, and admitted that the plaintiff was
allergic. The record contained no evidence that this product had ever
caused skin irritation prior to this case or that "many persons" were
22 Arnold v. May Dept. Stores Co., 337 Mo. 727 at 735, 85 S.W. (2d) 748 (1935).
Italics added.
23 The court's opinion does not state whether the defendant's duty to use due care
would bave been satisfied by acquainting the plaintiff with the manufacturer's warning or
whether it necessitated the application of a preliminary patch test.
24 See note 22 supra.
2 5 Briggs v. National Industries, Inc., (Cal. App., 1949) 207 P. (2d) 110.
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allergic to it. The trial court entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict. In affirming the trial court, the appellate court
said: "One of the essential elements of liability is knowledge on the
part of the manufacturer of the dangerous character of the product
There is no substantial evidence that the defendant corporation had
any such knowledge."26
In view of the lack of evidence of previous injuries from a similar
solution of thioglycollate acid or of medical knowledge that thioglycollate acid was a potent allergen, the court's decision is undoubtedly correct. But if the court meant that actual knowledge of the dangerous
character of the product is an essential element of liability, its opinion
is extremely doubtful. Suppose, for example, that the defendant in the
Briggs case had actual lmowledge of one previous injury from contact
with a 6.28% solution of thioglycollate acid but had been assured by
reliable medical experts that the chance of anyone else's suffering
injury was extremely remote. Suppose, on the other hand, that skin
specialists k:qew that 2% of the total population were allergic to the
solution but the defendant was not aware of this. 27 Is it likely that a
court would hold the defendant liable in the first case and not in the
second? "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed...." 28 What the defendant ought to know is as important as
what he does know. 29
The fact that the defendant in the Briggs case was the manufacturer and not the plaintiff's immediate vendor should be no obstacle
to imposing liability. The law has long recognized the duty of a manufacturer to warn the ultimate consumer of any known dangers. 30 And
if the manufacturer, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know of
some latent danger, the rule of the MacPherson case31 would seem to
dictate liability for failure to warn. 32
2s Id. at 112.
27 Medical articles published since the date of the plaintiff's injury in the Briggs case
show that her injury was not an isolated one. 131 J. AM.. Mm>. AssN. 592 (1946); 137
J. AM.. MED. AssN. 354 (1948); 57 AncH. DERMAT. & SYPH. 275 (1948); 15 !ND. MED,
669 (1946); 16 !ND. MED. 238 (1947). It would be interesting to see what effect this
literature would have on a similar fact situation today.
2s Cardozo, C. J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 at 344, 162 N.E.
99 (1928).
29 See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. (H.L.) 562 at 605.
so Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., (8th Cir. 1903) 120 F. 865.
s1 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916).
32 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E. (2d) 693 (1946), adopting the
MacPherson rule in Massachusetts, contains statements relevant to the allergy cases, but
the decision is ba~ed on the inference that the plaintiff was normal. Also, Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. (H.L.) 85.
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C. Should There Be Liability?
In a discussion of negligence, however, it is not enough to conclude
that there are sufficient legal rules available to impose liability on a
manufacturer or vendor for failing to warn the public that a small
minority of consumers capnot safely use the product. The more fundamental question is: should this burden be imposed on the manufacturer or vendor? To require the ordinary retailer of clothing, cosmetics,
and drugs to know the allergenic effect of his merchandise would be a
fantastic burden. 33 The responsibility for reducing the incidence of
injury to the allergic consumer properly rests on the manufacturer.34
To require the manufacturer to keep abreast of the most advanced
medical knowledge would seem most reasonable. So, also, would the
requirement that a manufacturer make elaborate prophetic patch tests
before marketing a new product.35 The argument that every consumer
should know the substances to which he is allergic should carry little
weight in an age when new drugs and chemicals are constantly being
marketed. If a manufacturer knows or should know, after making
proper tests, that a percentage of persons are allergic to an ingredient
in his product, it would seem reasonable to require that he place a
conspicuous warning on the label.36
On the other hand, a well-reasoned decision should consider the
effect of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 7 if the product is
one that is covered by the act. The FDCA sets up elaborate safeguards
in the manufacture and marketing of foods, drugs, and cosmetics and
provides for condemnation of products that do not meet the prescribed
standards of safety. Although section 502(e) of the statute requires
certain drugs to bear the name of each active ingredient, in part to
enable persons to avoid those drugs to which they are allergic,38 it is
83 Yet liability of retailers for breach of implied warranty is held more uniformly than
liability of manufacturers and wholesalers for negligence. See note 5 supra.
34 ''The reduction of the incidence of dermatitis among the users of furs is in the
hands of the dyers. In recent years they have been aware of this fact and have processed
the furs with greater care so that now we rarely see reports of cases." CooKE, Au.BRGY IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 281 (1947).
''While cosmetics as a class rank among the safest of substances • • • there are occasional outbreaks of dermatitis • . • from new and untried cosmetics. The cosmetic industry
owes it to the public and to itself to spare no effort in order to place only safe cosmetics on
sale." Id. at 282-3.
35 The prophetic patch test is described in CooKE, Au.BRGY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
278-9 (1947).
36 See note in 121 A.L.R. 947 (1939), citing the Gerkin case with approval. Also,
86 A.L.R. 947 (1933); 10 BROOKLYN L. RBv. 363 (1941).
s1 52 Stat. L. 1040, §§201-901 (1938), 21 U.S.C. (1946) §§ 301-392.
88 See S. Rep. No. 646 on S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 7-8 (1935).
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clear that the act was not designed to condemn products to which a few
people may be allergic. 39 Since the FDCA provides extensive safeguards for the general public, however, a court might reasonably conclude that there is no need to provide a damage remedy for the unfortunate few who are allergic. 40 This result would, of course, be unconvincing to the allergic plaintiff who can reasonably say that the
manufacturer, with actual or imputed knowledge of a danger, who fails
to warn the consumer is more at fault than the consumer. And the
FDCA does ·not cover items such as clothing, dye$ (other than cosmetics) and jewelry.
Perhaps a more fundamental objection to imposing a duty to warn
on manufacturers or vendors is simply that it would be a rare case in
which the failure to warn would be the cause in fact of the plaintiff's
injury.41 Even if the plaint#f were to read the warning, it is unlikely
that he would refrain from using the product unless he knew that he
was allergic to one of its ingredients. And if he has that knowledge, it
is not likely that he will use a new product, even if it displays no
warning, without first obtaining a physician's advice. To answer that
causation is simply a question of evidence does not solve the whole problem, because the plaintiff could always testify, with no fear of being
prosecuted for perjury, that he would not have used the product if it
had displayed a warning. He might, of course, be telling the truth,42
but it is quite likely that the plaintiff would recover even though a
causal relation would be lacking. And although the failure to warn
would be negligence, the probable absence of a causal relation would
often make the manufacturer an insurer of his product. That possibility might not be an absolute deterrent; it should, however, be considered.
39 S. Rep. No. 646 on S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1935); the court's charge
to the jury in United States v. 8 Packages (etc.) of Roux Lash and Brow Tint, (D.C.N.J.
1942), NonCEs OF JUDGMENTS UNDim THE FEDERAL Fooo, DRuG, & CosMEnc Aar, No.
76, p. 41.
40 See, generally, United States v. 62 Packages, More or Less, of Marmola Prescription Tablets, (D.C. Wis. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 878, affd. in (7th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d)
107; 26 VA. L. Rllv. 100 (1939); 3 Fooo, DRUG, CosMETic L.Q. 189 (1948). If a
sufficient number of persons are susceptible to a substance, it could be "adulterated" or
"poisonous" and within the ban of the FDCA. Since the same kind of quantitative distinction should be drawn in imposing a duty to warn in a negligence action, all persons
would not be protected under either remedy.
4 1 In some cases, this objection would not be present. For example, in the Gerkin case,
had the plaintiff been warned he would not have worn the coat for some three months
after the first sign of discomfort and would have avoided a serious dermatitis. In the usual
case, however, the allergic consumer suffers a relatively severe injury from a momentary
contact with the allergen.
42 See note 43 infra.
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Conclusion
The recent growth of medical knowledge of allergies will probably
have its repercussions in the courts. Several of the few cases available as a guide to courts and the legal profession have taken a doubtful
approach to the problem. Only one of the cases that take a more convincing approach has dealt with the problem of the manufacturer having no actual knowledge of the danger inherent in his product to a small
minority of consumers.43 Utilizing the doctrine of the MacPherson case,
however, it is not unlikely that courts will impose a duty on the manufacturer to use due care in ascertaining the allergenic effect of his
product and to warn the consumer of any discovered danger. Although
the imposition of that duty might result in a kind of strict liability, it
would have the beneficial effect of hastening the elimination of potent
allergens from many products.44

Zolman Cavitch, S.Ed.

43 Briggs v.
44 It might

National Industries, Inc., (Cal. App., 1949) 207 P. (2d) 110.
also have the following detrimental effect: one manufacturer lives up to
his duty by placing an omnious warning on the label of his product. Another manufacturer
of a similar product decides to risk liability rather than take the chance of scaring away
customers, and therefore does not place a warning on the label. The integrity of the first
manufacturer might place him at a serious advertising disadvantage.

